Introduction
Over the last decade or so, Britain has suffered a number of high profile flood events.
With critics warning of increases in their frequency and consequences due to climate change and development trends (ABI 2001; Evans et al. 2004) , and the Treasury and environmentalists united in their concerns about the financial and environmental costs of structural engineering to prevent floods, government policy has moved away from its traditional emphasis on flood defence to embrace a broader portfolio of measures variously designed to reduce and manage the risks from flooding (Butler & Pidgeon 2011; Faulkner et al 2010; Johnson & Priest 2008; Scrase & Sheate 2005) . The basic idea is neatly encapsulated in the title of the government's flood risk management strategy for England: Making Space for Water (Defra 2004; . In contrast to engineered defences designed to keep water away, the new risk-based approach seeks to make ‗space' for flooding, both literally and figuratively. The policy publicly acknowledges that -building ever higher and stronger defences is not sustainable‖ and thus that -it may be necessary to let some places flood more frequently in future. It will be important to understand the potential consequences and help communities to become more resilient and adapt to changing levels of risk‖ (Defra 2009: paras 60, 65) .
Spatial planning and development control play a key role in this new ‗risk-based' approach to flooding. As White and Richard (2007: 513) insist, planning is -the most sustainable method to manage flood risk in that not only can it provide for risk management, it can also avoid or even reduce risk [by] influenc [ing] factors such as the location, type, design, and function, of development‖. Despite such high hopes, there have been persistent questions about whether the planning system in England is up to the task (cf. ABI 2001; Penning-Rowsell 2001; White & Howe 2002 , 2004 Wynn 2005) , and the need to improve its capacity to manage flood risks has been a persistent theme of various ex-post investigations and ‗lessons learned' reports into the management of flooding and the conduct of the Environment Agency (EA), the non-departmental public body with strategic responsibility for flood risk management in England and Wales. The EA (e.g. 1999: 8; 2003: 12; 2007: 19) has responding to these criticisms by blaming the planning system for allowing inappropriate development and insisting, -our regulatory powers need strengthening‖ (EA 2003a: 12) . However, planning in England is a delegated responsibility of local government, which has historically enjoyed broad discretion in formulating local development plans and licensing applications for development within an overarching, national framework of principles and performance targets set by central government (Cullingworth & Nadin 2006; Rydin 2003; Tewdwr-Jones 1999) . Planning professionals are generalists, and while government circulars on planning policy (e.g. Circular 31/47; DoE 1992) have long recommended they seek expert advice about flooding from the EA and its various predecessors, there was no obligation on local planning authorities (LPAs) to heed, or even to seek, that advice.
Recent regulatory reforms have reduced that discretion and increased the influence of the EA over LPA decision-making in England. To tighten controls over developments in flood prone areas, planning policy guidance was revised in 2001 and its status upgraded from a ‗circular' to a more formal Planning Policy Guidance Note (PPG25). PPG25 made the EA a statutory consultee on all applications for planning permission in areas at risk of flooding, and flood risk was designated as a material considerations that LPAs must take into account by requiring applicants to produce a formal Flood Risk Assessment (FRA) and LPAs to follow a sequence of risk-based decision rules designed -to avoid such risk where possible and managing it elsewhere‖ (DETR 2001: 1) . Urged by the independent review into the Easter 1998 floods to -assert and defend [more] vigorously its advice‖ (Bye & Horner 1998: 9) , the EA began monitoring LPA compliance with its advice and to name and shame LPAs granting planning permissions against its advice through the publication of annual High Level Target reports. In 2006, the EA was given additional powers to ‗call in' for review by the central Government local planning applications granted contrary to its sustained objections, as part of further revisions to planning policy guidance on flooding made when all PPGs were replaced by Planning Policy Statements (and PPG25 superseded by PPS25).
To supplement these formal roles in planning, the EA also produced a series of national flood risk maps to -help local authority planners understand how flood risk may affect and be affected by development proposals‖ (EA 2010: 3) . These maps depict the probability of flooding, using different colors to mark out zones exposed to different levels of risk from fluvial and tidal flooding. The first such map, the Indicative Flood Map (IFM) (see Figure 1a ), was published in 1999 and was essentially binary, indicating a safe zone and areas exposed to a risk from river flood events with a 1% annual probability or from coastal flooding events with a 0.5% annual probability. In 2004, the IFM was replaced by a new Flood Zone Map (see Figure 1b) , which uses more up-to-date and nationally consistent modeling to recalculate the 1% and 0.5% flood outlines of the IFM, which are now designated as Flood Zone 3 of ‗high probability'. The current Flood Map also outlines a second Zone 2 at medium risk of flooding from an extreme event with a 1%-0.1% annual probability, and for this reason is sometimes called the Extreme Flood Outline (EFO) map to distinguish it from the IFM.
1 The residual area of ‗little or no risk' is termed Zone 1 (for details on the methodology, see Bradbrook et al 2005) . These zones enable LPAs to fulfill the requirements first introduced under PPG25 to apply a ‗Sequential Test' in formulating their local development frameworks and licensing applications for development so as to steer development away zones at higher risk into those at lower risk and preferably into Zone 1 with little or no risk at all.
[FIGURE 1a -The Indicative Floodplain Map]
1 We refer to these maps collectively as the ‗Flood Map' and use the terms IFM and EFO to distinguish between separate editions of it, while reserving the lower case ‗flood maps' to refer generically to the technology of flood risk mapping in general. It is important to recognize that in addition to the Flood Map the EA has also produced a third national flood risk map as part of the National Flood Risk Assessment (NaFRA). The NaFRA map differs from the EA Flood Map in its methods and assumptions, in particular taking account of flood defences when calculating its flood outlines (Krieger 2011) . That flood map is not used to inform planning policymaking, and so is beyond the scope of this paper.
[FIGURE 1b -The Flood Zone Map]
Although promoted as -indicative only, to be used as a basis for consultation and not as the sole basis for decisions on where planning policies apply‖ (DETR 2001: para 24) , such decision-support tools should be understood as political artefects that -embody specific forms of power and authority‖ (Winner 1986: 19) . Critical cartographers, for example, have emphasized that maps are shot through with relations of power, which they reflect and reproduce (Crampton & Krygier 2006) .
Deconstructing maps as texts, geographers have highlighted critical silences, such as the erasure of native peoples from lands depicted as empty --terra nullius -and awaiting European colonization (Harley 1989; Sparke 1998; Clayton 2000) , and traced the political programmes advanced through map projections of places, objects, and spaces that are then reshaped, both symbolically and materially, through the very process of their cartographic enframing (e.g. Cosgrove 2000; Demeritt 2001a; Farish 2006; Monmonier 1997) . Maps are ways of worldmaking, generative of new ways of seeing and being (Wood 2010 Interpretative flexibility in both the construction and application of technologies means such political designs are not automatically realized (Pinch & Bijker 1987) .
Nevertheless, it is increasingly clear that standardization in and through technology is a central, if heretofore often overlooked, motor of modernity, helping to organize and regulate social and political life by ensuring consistency and communicability across time and space (Timmermans & Epstein 2010) .
Technical objects, like the flood maps, come to incorporate -scripts‖ (Akrich 1992) , which configure their users by inviting them to perform particular identity positions and practices built into their design. Users, in turn, often adapt those scripts to their own contexts and purposes. Thus it is important to study technology in the contexts of its application and to appreciate the trials of force, as users either submit or subvert the standards of conduct scripted for them by system designers. In the case of decision support technologies, the aim is typically to make decision-making less arbitrary and more rational by standardizing both the information considered by decision makers and the protocols they use to reach their decisions. While the formalization of medical decision-making has routinely been promoted as a way to transform clinical practice from an art into an evidence-based science (Berg 1997; Timmermans & Berg 2003) , Porter (1995) highlights the political implications of adhering to strict decision rules. By reducing the scope for partiality and subjective bias, formal decision rules lend authority to administrative decisions otherwise vulnerable to challenge: -A decision made by the numbers (or by explicit rules of some other sort) has at least the appearance of being fair and impersonal... [and] is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide‖ (Porter 1995: 8) .
This suggests that the use of risk measures, like flood maps, is about more than just providing information with which to assess and thereby reduce the probability and consequences of harms, like flooding. No longer just an object to be governed, risk is increasingly central to the organization of governance itself, providing the concepts and tools to resolve an ever-expanding range of governance problems (Power 2004; Hutter 2005; Rothstein et al 2006) . For instance, in a climate of fiscal restraint, risk provides a rationale to allocate resources-whether for flood defences and maintenance, forecasting and warning systems, inspection and enforcement efforts, or on more detailed mapping and monitoring so as to steer those functions more precisely--where they are needed most, maximizing efficiency while also ensuring the transparency and public acceptance of contentious decisions about who will--and will not--benefit from public investment in flood risk management (Krieger 2011 selected from a purposeful sample of LPAs designed, first to capture those at greatest risk of flooding and so having the most experience of working with the EA and its 
The Flood Map and Its Script for Planning Practice
While there is a long history of mapping the high water marks from historic floods to delineate areas at risk from flooding (Monmonier 1997 showing that the benefits adequately match costs‖ of agricultural land reclamation (Southern Water Authority, 1979: para 11.1). Not surprisingly, these maps had little influence on spatial planning (Bowers 1983; Penning-Rowsell et al. 1986 ). Providing better information to control development around flooding ‗hotspots' was the explicit aim of the maps called for by Section 105(2) of the 1991 Water Resources Act, but they were patchy in their coverage, inconsistent in their methods, and late in their delivery (Bye & Horner 1998: 43 , so that in the aftermath of the Easter 1998 floods, the EA was exposed to severe criticism for its failures both to protect people from flooding and warn them they were at risk. Rather than outright veto powers, the EA (1998) favored strengthening the general presumption against development, a recommendation echoed by the influential Select Committee report:
we believe that a clear presumption should be made against future development in flood plain land where the flooding risk attached to a particular development, as determined by the Environment Agency, is deemed to outweigh the benefits (House of Commons, 1998a: para 89) .
To that end, the Select Committee recommended that the EA make -the production of flood warning hazard maps and their delivery to local authorities‖ its -highest priority‖ (House of Commons, 1998a: para 112) . In response, the Government inculcating new rationalities of rule and self-regulation (Rose & Miller 1992) . These rather synoptic accounts of governmental regulation can be fleshed out by drawing on the sociology of science and technology to show how they were enacted through the Flood Map and its visualization of flooding as a calculable risk. In particular the concept of a technological ‗script' highlights how, like the script of a film, the design of -technical objects define[s] a framework of action together with actors and the space in which they are supposed to act‖ (Akrich 1992: 208) .
In designing its Flood Map, the EA was keen to address the ignorance, wilful or otherwise, of LPAs about the management of flood risks for which it was responsible. Citing -numerous examples of developments… which were allowed against the advice of the Agency and its predecessors‖ (House of Commons 1998a: para 86), EA officials saw the map as another way in which it was -continuing to seek to influence and educate those [LPAs] least willing to recognise the problems created by development in flood risk areas‖ (EA 1998: 5.3.6 ). An official Flood Map would concretize the EA's knowledge of flood risk and make it both easier for LPAs to access and, at the same time, harder for them to ignore (Bye & Horner 1998; Thomalla 2001; White & Howe 2002) .
That desire to -ensure that local planning authorities (LPAs) consult us and take our advice in the planning process‖ informed the way flood risk was visualized The coarse scale of the Flood Map also served to script the behaviour of its users.
Without being able to resolve individual properties, LPAs would be compelled first to require developers to commission additional, more detailed flood risk assessments, and second to contact the EA for further technical advice. The choice of scale also indemnified the EA against liability for providing a property-level risk assessment and against complaints about the effects of its Flood Map on property values or access to insurance .
Another important feature of the Flood Map and its script for planning is its treatment of flood defences. The initial IFM did not show any flood defences at all so as to amplify the perception of risk and encourage consultation. As Geoff Mance, Director of Water Management at the EA explained in 2000:
At this stage we have deliberately not shown whether there is a defence in place. We wanted people to ask questions and to find out. The first thing is to flag up whether somewhere is a risk area and then they can take an interest and seek further information (House of Commons 2000b: question 82) .
From 2004, the revised and reissued EFO did include -information on where defences are located and the areas benefiting from these defences‖ (EA 2009b), but its calculation of different zones of flood risk is still based on a natural, or unimpeded, flood outline that specifically discounts the protections provided by defences.
There were several institutional considerations behind their exclusion from the EA Flood Map. First, as the agency responsible for flood defence, the EA has a major interest communicating the residual risk from those defences being overtopped or otherwise failing in the face of extreme events beyond the design standard to which they were built. Although both the Government and the EA have repeatedly emphasized the impossibility of providing absolute protection against flooding, the EA has, nevertheless, been subject to regular criticisms after flood events. In this context, the National Audit Office explained that -defended areas were purposely Parker, 1995) . EA officials were acutely conscious of the moral hazard involved in the diversion of their scarce public funding to protect inappropriate private development sanctioned by LPAs not responsible for the cost of defending them (House of Commons 1998b : 2000b . By amplifying perception of residual risk, the EA was determined to shift institutional responsibility on to LPAs for preventing in appropriate developments in the first place rather than having to bear the defend them later on.
Lastly, in interviews EA officials also acknowledged how mapping the outline for undefended flood risks tends to increase the spatial extent of predicted flood outlines and thereby to expand the scope of the EA's authority in planning by requiring more people to contact it for detailed, site-by-site assessments.
In [the map] is a way for us to say: don't develop in areas at-risk of flooding.
Don't even plan to. Don't even think about trying to develop here and then trying to get us to build defences. If they see its at-risk: don't build there! (original emphasis).
Rather than just guiding decision making, the intention was that planners' decisionmaking should be determined by the Flood Map. If the map shows some area to be at risk of flooding, then the EA hoped the decision would automatically be: ‗don't build there'. To reinforce the authority of that advice, the EA began to monitor LPA compliance and to name and shame those LPAs ignoring its script for planning. As
Senior Flood Risk Policy Manager 5 at the EA explained:
High-Level Targets have turned into a bit of ‗name and shame' for Local Authorities. They don't like their name being up there on the top of the list. But, in some ways, if they can full justify why they're going against our advice then good luck to them.
As an ‗obligatory passage point' through which all planning decisions would be filtered (Latour 1987) , the Flood Map was supposed to ensure more rational, 
Impacts on Planning Outcomes in England
Official statistics provide two measures of the influence the EA on planning outcomes Advice'‖ on minor applications and its -increasing uptake by LPAs‖ (EA 2009a: 13) has enabled it to focus its scrutiny on larger, more consequential developments. But in constructing its headline figure of 96% compliance with its advice, the EA is engaging in statistical sleight of hand, by the dividing the number of applications known to have been permitted by LPAs contrary to EA advice (row 6 in Table 1 ) by the total number of cases to which the EA objected (row 2 Table 1 ). This conveniently overlooks the -disappointing‖ number of cases in which LPAs fail to -inform us of the final outcome of our objections‖ (EA 2009a: 41) , despite the specific requirement to do so in PPS25 (para.29).
These statistics reinforce claims about an ongoing implementation gap between high-level flood risk strategies and LPA practice. White and Richards (2007) found an uneven pattern of uptake of national flood guidance in local development plans, while Wynn's (2005) survey of English LPAs found that nearly three quarters of LPAs were prepared to accept an application for development in Flood Zones 2 and 3 without the required FRA. This administrative failing remains the leading cause of EA objections on flood risk grounds, and its frustration is palpable:
It is a matter of concern that 7 years after the publication of PPG25 a very large proportion of consultations are still being submitted to the Environment Agency without a satisfactory FRA as required by PPG/PPS25 (EA 2009a: 20) While most LPA decisions seem to be in line with EA advice and the percentage of decisions taken contrary to EA advice has steadily fallen, it remains much higher than the headline figure reported by the EA, and in addition to 8.8% of applications known to have been permitted in the face of specific objections from the EA on flood grounds in 2008/9, a further 9.4% of applications to which the EA objected were refused by the LPA, but not on the grounds of flood risk, which implies that LPAs did not regard flood risk and EA advice about it as -sufficient grounds for refusal‖ (Richards et al 2008: 13) . Data from the Land Use Change Statistics and HLT reports suggest that planning decision-making may not be following the exact script set out for it.
Responses to the EA and Its Flood Map
Technology is generative, and its effects are not entirely determined by the scripts built into it by system designers. Users and their contexts of application play an important role in shaping the wider ‗technological frame' within which the capacities of technical objects are ultimately realized (Pinch & Bijker 1987) . Whereas the EA In addition to these differences in professional outlook, planners drew another distinction between democratically accountable LPAs and the EA: -unlike the Agency, LPAs are political organisations‖ (Planner 9) and must respond to the wishes of local voters. While professional officers deal with minor development applications as a matter of routine, major development applications are decided upon by elected members, as is the wider Local Development Framework (LDF) within which all such LPA decisions were taken. Since -the way it [the political system] is designed is that we do it [i.e. make decisions]‖, it was thus a source of no little irritation for LPAs to be named and shamed by the EA in its HLT reports, as if it were -the judge and jury, whereas their role is to advise us‖ (Planner 2). As another planner put it -the EA give advice; we give permission‖ (Planner 6). Many planners felt that in second guessing This need for speed lay at the heart of two intertwined complaints about the Flood Map and its script for planning. First, planners sometimes complained that the Flood Map did not provide sufficient spatial resolution to judge individual planning applications. As Planner 6 put it, -the accuracy of the [Flood] Map at the level of detail we require for making clear-cut decisions just isn't there‖. The EA, of course, never designed the Flood Map for that purpose. It wanted planners to require developers to produce a more detailed FRA as part of their application and then to consult the EA for more detailed assessment of its merits. Planners, however, resisted this script. While this was partly a response to complaints from developers about the added costs of requiring an FRA -even for reasonably minor extensions… that might be more costly than the rest of the process put together‖ (Planner 21), planners were even more sensitive to the impacts on their speed of determination targets of the involved process of consultation and site-specific flood risk assessment envisioned by the EA. They needed greater speed and certainty than such consultation allowed, which takes us to a second reason why Planner 6 thought -there is a problem with the scale [of the Flood Map] and not being able to drill down to specifics‖. In interviews planners frequently complained that the EA was too slow in responding to consultation requests, a concern echoed in the responses to the consultations over PPS25:
LPAs were particularly concerned about how the Environment Agency would ensure that responses would be received in time for LPA targets for dealing deciding planning applications to be met (DCLG 2006a: 22) .
Such concerns are corroborated by Wynn's (2005) will not only upset but will be jumped on by developers.
As Table 1 shows, in nearly 10% of cases where the EA has sustained objections on flood risk grounds, LPAs have not felt confident enough to base their rejection on that basis (Richards et al 2008) .
In response to those concerns, the EA is committed to updating the Flood Map quarterly to incorporate the very latest science. Long-serving planners recognized that that EFO had improved upon the IFM and was getting better all the time. three months later we had updated plans from the EA, which was as a response to them gleaming additional information through the planning process to improve the accuracy of those plans. We had developers saying to us which plans are you dealing with. ...We found ourselves in a situation where there were outline planning consents granted on the back of the original maps ... but by the time we got to consider the application the maps had changed. So, which ones apply? And certainly when we dealt with the Planning Inspectorate he thought that this was a moving fixture that is impacting upon the basis on which we would manage the application.
The best flood risk science, then, is not necessarily the most useful science. Rather, as
Theodore Porter (1994: 391) remarks, -standardization and proper surveillance are in some ways more important to a public measurement system than a close approximation to true values‖. Paradoxically, efforts to increase the scientific quality of the Flood Map increased the uncertainties about its application in planning.
Rescripting the Flood Map
Although PPG 25 was the newest and most detailed planning policy guidance We came to the conclusion that the SFRA had no validity unless the Agency signed off on it. Otherwise they'll just ask the Secretary of State to intervene on everything and we would be back at square one. So you have to reach some sort of agreement.
Shorn of its decision-support role for planning, the EA Flood Map has been repurposed as tool for communicating flood risk to the general public . The aim is now to -encourage people living and working in areas prone to flooding to find out more and take appropriate action‖ (EA 2009b). As with the script for planning, this communicative strategy presumes that public awareness of flood risk is low and that risk and vulnerability can be reduced if those exposed -understand to life and property, but the responsibility for managing those potential harms also creates various second-order institutional risks of blame in the event of failure to discharge that responsibility properly (Rothstein et al. 2006) . In this context, risk maps do much more than just represent the spatial distribution of hazards to health and safety. They also provide an instrument for regulating those risks, by defining areas subject to additional controls, and for accounting for the inevitable limits of those controls, both enabling LPAs to over-ride those controls by exercising the riskbased Sequential and Exception Tests and to deflect blame in the event of some flood event by pointing to all the reasonably practicable measures they had taken to mitigate and manage the risks of such an eventuality.
Drawing on traditions of critical cartography and science studies, we showed how the Flood Map was designed to standardize the process by which flood risk was considered in LPA decision-making and thereby to ensure planning decisions were 
